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Tucker Act Jurisdiction over 
Breach of Trust Claims 
Gregory K. Orrne* 
While an Air Force pilot languished in a North Vietnamese 
prison camp, the Secretary of the Air Force allowed the pilot's 
accumulated pay account to be dissipated by his extravagant and 
adulterous wife. Southern Paiute Indians were eligible to share in 
a sizable Indian Claims Comrgission award, but were never noti- 
fied by the Secretary of the Interior prior to distribution of the 
fund. Forest lands held by the federal government for individual 
Quinalt Indians were mismanaged. Pomo Indians of the Robinson 
Rancheria in California had their rancheria status unlawfully ter- 
minated. 
The injured party in each of these cases sought recovery in 
federal court, claiming the action in question constituted a 
breach of trust by the United States. In each case, damages for 
breach of trust were sought pursuant to provisions of the Tucker 
Act, which provides for jurisdiction of claims against the United 
States "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Con- 
gress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any 
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liqui- 
dated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."' 
In each instance, the jurisdiction of the court to consider the 
claim against the United States based on a breach of trust theory 
was challenged. This Article considers the propriety of Tucker 
Act jurisdiction over breach of trust claims against the federal 
government in the context of these four cases. 
Through legislation later known as the Tucker Act,2 Congress 
* B.A., 1975, University of Utah; J.D., 1978, George Washington University. 
1. 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(2) (1976). 
2. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
The act bears the name of its principal author and promoter, John Randolph Tucker, 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Tucker, a Virginian, served in the House from 
1875 to 1887. J. DANIELS, THE RANDOLPHS OF VIRGINIA 315 (1976). Tucker was later elected 
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in 1887 established a jurisdictional scheme, which has survived 
to the present, covering a broad range of claims against the 
United States. It was not the first such device for the judicial 
consideration of claims against the national government. 
In 1855, after more than a half-century of wrestling with 
private claims against the United States through the cumber- 
some device of special legislation, a beleaguered Congress was 
ready for a change? Creation of a Board of Claims, whose mem- 
bers would serve for four-year terms, was first contemplated in 
the Senate.4 The substitute bill, which became law, provided for 
a Court of Claims to be composed of judges who would serve 
"during good behavior ."5 
The court was charged to "hear and determine all claims 
founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an 
executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, 
with the government of the United States, which may be sug- 
president of the American Bar Association and astounded many of his supporters when 
he thereafter appeared before the Supreme Court on behalf of the Chicago Haymarket 
Riot anarchists. When criticized for his actions, Tucker responded: " 'I do not defend 
anarchy, . . . I defend the Constitution.' " Id. 
3. The quantum of private claims pressed upon the Congress by citizens and their 
claims agents had grown with the country. As Senator Brodhead explained: 
Two days of every week-one third of the time, to say nothing of the time spent 
by committees-is set apart for the consideration of private bills and reports, 
and yet not much more than half are acted upon; and yet the people complain 
that our sessions are too long. Want of time leads to improper legislation, and 
often to  great injustice. Those who have honest claims are postponed for 
years. . . . The pressure of business of a private character prevents us from 
considering great questions in a way becoming statesmen representing this great 
people, and this extended empire. Our time is too valuable to be occupied in 
discussing the merits or demerits of a private bill. . . . Besides, we are run down 
by private claimants, and their agents or attorneys; and private claims are 
either passed or pressed into the appropriation bills the last nights of our ses- 
sions, contrary to the rules of the Senate, and injurious to the character of 
Congress. 
CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1854). 
4. Id. a t  70-71. The bill was introduced by Senator Brodhead of Pennsylvania, whose 
remarks on the bill included the colorful, if less than rousing, endorsement: "I am quite 
certain, and feel justified in asserting, that if it does not do great good, it is free from 
constitutional objection, and will do no harm." Id. at  70. 
5. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. Employment of the quoted phrase from 
art. I11 of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. III, $ 1, did not prevent a lively debate over 
whether the court's judges would be article I11 judges. Compare, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 33d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 110-11 (1855) (remarks of Senators Pratt and Clayton) with id. a t  110,112 
(remarks of Senators Weller and Chase). 
The Court of Claims, as altered by subsequent legislation, was adjudged not an article 
I11 court in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). The opposite result was 
reached in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). 
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gested to it by a petition filed therein."Vhe court was not vested 
with the power to render final judgments, but was charged with 
the responsibility of transmitting to Congress its findings and the 
testimony taken, together with its opinion and a draft bill "as if 
enacted, will carry the same into effect" for final disp~sition.~ 
Within a few years Congress concluded it had not gone far 
enough. Delay in the final disposition of claims remained signifi- 
cant. In the words of Representative A.G. Porter of Indiana: 
Under the practice of the House, the opinion and testimony in 
each case are referred to the Committee of Claims, where the 
decision, instead of being treated with the respect due to the 
solemn adjudication, is regarded, in many instances, with little 
more consideration than the petition of the ~ l a i m a n t . ~  
Legislation was enacted in 1863 that, among other things, made 
the court's judgments final and provided for jurisdiction over 
counterclaims asserted by the go~ernment.~ 
By 1886 some members of Congress perceived the need to 
further broaden the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. In that 
year Representative Tucker reported for the House Committee on 
the Judiciary: 
[I]t has long been felt that the benefits could be made much 
greater by extending the jurisdiction of the court. By confining 
it to claims under a law of the United States, regulations of 
Departments, and to cases of contracts expressed and implied, 
there is still a large class of cases in equity, in admiralty, and 
in tortious acts of the Government through its agents, which are 
6. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, Ej 1, 10 Stat. 612. 
7. Id. 9 7 at 613. 
8. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. app., a t  124 (1862). Representative Porter also 
quoted from a letter received from an assistant solicitor of the court: 
When I first came into the court it was attended by a very numerous and 
highly respectable bar, and the anxiety of claimants to bring their cases to trial 
was very great. But by the close of the third session after the organization of 
the court, claimants saw that its judgments, if favorable, helped them very little 
in Congress, for it required quite as much labor and expense to procure the 
passage of the bills reported by the court as to procure the passage of those 
introduced by members. 
Id. 
9. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765. The House had passed a bill that would 
have further broadened the court's jurisdiction to include all claims against the United 
States, except those based on treaty or preempted by congressional joint resolution, 
whether arising in law or equity. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. app., a t  124 (1862) 
(remarks of Rep. Porter). That provision did not survive the conference committee. See 
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1480 (1863) (remarks of Rep. Porter). 
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left to Congress, for which a court of justice is better fitted to 
attain the right between the litigants.I0 
The committee's draft bill proposed to expand the court's juris- 
diction to include "[all1 claims founded upon the Constitution 
of the United States or any law of Congress, or any regulation of 
an executive department," as well as claims "for damages, liqui- 
dated or unliquidated, in respect of which claims the party would 
be entitled to redress against the United States either in a court 
of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States were suable."li 
Provision was also made for concurrent jurisdiction in the regular 
federal courts for claims less than $10,000.i2 The House passed the 
bill in this form, but the Senate appended to the phrase "for 
damages, liquidated or unliquidated" the qualifying language "in 
cases not sounding in tort."13 This change was accepted by the 
conference committeei4 and the Tucker Act became law. 
10. H.R. REP. NO. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1886). 
11. H.R. 6974, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1, 18 CONG. REC. 623 (1887) (bill as read by 
clerk). 
Notwithstanding the previously enacted solutions to the problem, the committee was 
still constrained to report: 
The large mass of business now before Congress growing out of private claims 
consumes its time year after year in committee work, rendered useless by the 
lack of time to consider and pass upon them. Just claims are painfully deferred 
without interest, and the credit of the Government, so strictly upheld upon its 
bonded debt, is justly censured in respect to its honest private claims. 
H.R. REP. NO. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1886). 
The committee sought a final solution to  the continued burden of claims brought 
before Congress: 
Mr. TUCKER. . . . The only cases not provided for are suits upon the use 
of a patent right by the Government and suits in reference to captured and 
abandoned property which are now barred by the statutes of limitations. This 
bill extends the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to all cases which arise, not 
only ex contractu but ex delicto, and to cases in admiralty, so that it will take 
the whole mass of these claims away from Congress. 
. . . .  
Mr. REED. . . . As I understand, the effect of the bill is that the United 
States can be made a party defendant in any suit where an individual could be 
made a party defendant. 
Mr. TUCKER. Yes, sir. 
18 CONG. REC. 622 (1887). 
12. H.R. 6974, 49th Cong., 2d Sess, § 2, 18 CONG. REC. 623 (1887). 
13. Id. $ 1, 18 CONG. REC. a t  2175 (Senate amendment as read by clerk). 
14. 18 CONG. REC. 2611, 2676 (1887) (conference committee report). See also id. a t  
2677 (statement of House conferees). (Claims for pensions, Civil War claims, and pre- 
viously rejected claims were also excluded.) 
The gap left by the exclusion of tort claims was subsequently filled-with abundant 
exceptions, see 28 U.S.C. (i 2680 (1976)-by the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, $ 9  401- 
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Numerous special jurisdiction statutes have been enacted to 
give the Court of Claims jurisdiction over a particular claim or 
class of claims not otherwise within its subject matter compe- 
tence, but the principal jurisdictional grant of the Tucker Act has 
been little changed. The Judicial Code of 1911 made modest 
changes in phrase~logy,~"ut sought only to state "in concise 
terms the existing jurisdiction of the Court of Claims."Vhe 1948 
legislation that revised title 28 of the United States Code and 
enacted it into positive law1' listed the Tucker Act claim catego- 
ries n~merical ly. '~ The phrase "in respect of which claims the 
party would be entitled to redress against the United States ei- 
ther in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States 
were suable" was also eliminated as "unnecessary" for the rather 
cryptic reason that "the Court of Claims manifestly, under this 
section will determine whether a petition against the United 
States states a cause of action."lV Subsequent legislation elimi- 
nated the numerical listing of the jurisdictional categories and 
made the phraseology of 28 U.S.C. 5 1491, concerning theaCourt 
of Claims, correspond to the district court concurrent jurisdiction 
provision of 28 U.S.C. 9 l346(a) (2) .20 
The Court of Claims' basic jurisdictional provision, con- 
tained in 28 U.S.C. § 1491, now provides: 
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judg- 
ment upon any claim against the United States founded either 
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation 
of an executive department, or upon any express or implied 
424, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The.Act vested 
jurisdiction in the district courts over 
claim[s] against the United States, for money only, accruing on and after 
January 1, 1945, on account of damages to or loss of property, or on account of 
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of 
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment. 
Id. 4 410 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976)). Provision was also made for 
optional appellate review of such cases in the Court of Claims, rather than the circuit 
courts of appeal, but it is a procedure seldom utilized. Id. 5 412 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. 9 1504 (1976)). 
15. Judicial Code, ch. 231, $ 145, 36 Stat. 1087 (1911). 
16. S. REP. NO. 388 (pt. I) ,  61st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1910). 
17. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (1948). 
18. Id. fi 1491. 
19. H.R. REP. NO. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. app., a t  138 (1947). 
20:Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 44, 68 Stat. 1226. See also H.R. REP. NO. 1981, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954). 
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contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliqui- 
dated damages in cases not sounding in tort.** 
Section l346(a) (2) vests in the district courts, concurrent with the 
Court of Claims, jurisdiction over the same subject matter in 
cases where the claim does not exceed $10,000.22 
Several modern cases brought pursuant to the general 
Tucker Act jurisdictional grant involved claims for breach of a 
federal trust relationship and were decided on the merits with 
little apparent concern about the existence of juri~diction.~~ The
current controversy must therefore be understood against the 
background of United States v. Testan, 24 the latest in a long series 
of Supreme Court cases circumscribing the scope of Tucker Act 
j u r i sd i~ t ion .~~  Even though the Court in that case claimed to 
merely apply "established  principle^,"^^ the decision has been 
treated as announcing a definitive jurisdictional test for a broad 
range of claims sought to be brought under the Tucker Act." 
Testan involved a claim by two government attorneys that 
their positions should have been classified as GS-14 rather than 
GS-13. After exhausting their administrative remedies, the attor- 
neys brought suit in the Court of Claims seeking prospective re- 
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). 
22. Id. § 1346(a)(2). The jurisdiction conferred on the district courts by § 1346(a)(2) 
is in all respects, save amount in controversy, precisely co-extensive with the Court of 
Claims' jurisdiction under 9 1491, despite the much broader scope of subject matter 
jurisdiction otherwise enjoyed by the district courts. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 
312 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1941). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes 
v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. C1. 1975). Not in this category are cases such as 
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942), and Menominee Tribe v. United 
States, 59 F. Supp. 137 (Ct. C1.1945), which also involved breach of trust claims but which 
were brought pursuant to expansive special jurisaiction statutes. See, e.g., Act of May 20, 
1924, ch. 162.43 Stat. 133, as amended by Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 651,50 Stat. 650; Act 
of Sept. 3, 1935, ch. 839, 49 Stat. 1085. 
24. 424 U.S. 392 (1976). 
25. See, e.g., United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969) (no jurisdiction to issue decla- 
ratory judgments); United States v. Holland-America Lijn, 254 U.S. 148 (1920) (no juris- 
diction over the alleged torts of federal officials) (distinguishing Dooley v. United States, 
182 U.S. 222 (1900) (whether or not claim sounds in tort is irrelevant if claim is founded 
upon law of Congress)); United States v. Jones, 131 U S .  1 (1889) (jurisdiction limited to 
entering judgments for money; no jurisdiction to command specific performance). 
26. 424 U.S. a t  400. 
27. See, e.g, Jalil v. Campbell, 590 F.2d 1120, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hill v. United 
States, 571 F.2d 1098, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978); Duarte v. United States, 532 F.2d 850,851- 
52 (2d Cir. 1976); Gentry v. United States, 546 F.2d 343, 345-46 & n.1 (Ct. C1. 1976). 
8551 TUCKER ACT JURISDICTION 861 
classification and an award of backpay. A divided Court of 
Claims found the administrative refusal to reclassify plaintiffs 
arbitrary, but the court concluded that it lacked power to man- 
date the employees' reclassification. A monetary award was 
deemed permissible but premature until an entitlement to the 
governmental position was created by the proper authority. 
Therefore, the case was ordered remanded to the Civil Service 
Cornmiss i~n .~~  If on remand the Civil Service Commission should 
order reclassification, tha t  action "could create a legal right 
which [could then be enforced] by a money j ~ d g m e n t . " ~ ~  The 
Supreme Court disagreed. 
Justice Blackmun, in an opinion that drew no dissent, first 
quoted from United States v. KingS0 for the proposition that 
Tucker Act jurisdiction is limited to money claims against the 
United  state^.^' He then articulated the Court's general approach 
to the case: 
The Tucker Act, of course, is itself only a jurisdictional 
statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable 
against the United States for money damages. The Court of 
Claims has recognized that the Act merely confers jurisdiction 
upon it whenever the substantive right exists. . . . We therefore 
must determine whether the two other federal statutes that are 
invoked by the respondents confer a substantive right to recover 
money damages from the United States for the period of their 
allegedly wrongful civil service  classification^.^^ 
The Court first rejected what it deemed the "implicit" con- 
clusion of the lower court that the Classification Act "gives rise 
to a claim for money damages for pay lost by reason of the alleg- 
edly wrongful classifications."3S The Court stated that, as a sover- 
eignty, the United States cannot be sued without its consent, 
" 'and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that 
court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.' "34 Such consent to suit 
" 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.' "35 
28. 424 U.S. at 393-96. The Court of Claims is authorized to remand in the following 
terms: "In any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall have the power to remand 
appropriate matters to any administrative or executive body or official with such direction 
as it may deem proper and just." 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). 
29. Testan v. United States, 499 F.2d 690, 691 (Ct. C1. 1974). 
30. 395 U.S. 1 (1969). 
31. 424 U.S. at 397-98. 
32. Id. at 398. 
33. Id. at 399. 
34. Id. (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 
35. Id. (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)). 
862 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
"Thus," wrote Justice Blackmun, "except as Congress has con- 
sented to a cause of action against the United States, 'there is no 
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims more than in any other court 
to entertain suits against the United States.' "36 
The Court also rejected the contention that the Tucker Act 
itself waived sovereign immunity with respect to all claims 
"invoking a constitutional provision or a federal statute or regula- 
t i~n . "~ '  Justice Blackmun wrote that since the claim in issue was 
not based on contract and was not one for the return of money 
paid the government, " [i]t follows that the asserted entitlement 
to money damages depends upon whether any federal statute 'can 
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
Government for the damage sustained.' "38 He and his brethern 
declined "to tamper with these established  principle^,"^^ and held 
that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdi~tion.~~ 
The Court subjected the Back Pay Act to similar scrutiny 
and found that it granted "a monetary cause of action only to 
those who were subjected to a reduction in their duly appointed 
emoluments or p~sition,"~' not to those who contended they were 
entitled to positions other than the ones they held. The claim- 
ants' suit was ordered dismissed.42 
A. Mitchell v. United States44 
Mitchell involved four related actions by individual Quinalt 
36. Id. (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1941)). 
37. Id. a t  400. 
38. Id. (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. C1. 
1967)). The Supreme Court has since held that an "authorized regulation" that can be so 
interpreted also satisfies this inquiry. See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S. 123, 128 
(1976) (per curiam). 
39. 424 U.S. a t  400. 
40. Id. at 403-04. Therefore, the remand ordered by the Court of Claims was inappro- 
priate since remand is available only in "cases already within the court's jurisdiction." 
Id. at 404 & n.7. "The present litigation [was] not such a case." Id. a t  404. 
41. Id. at 407. 
42. Id. at 408. The foregoing discussion of Testan is limited to a recapitulation of the 
Court's decision in order to facilitate understanding of the context in which the cases 
discussed in the next Section arose. A more critical assessment of the Court's decision in 
Testan is undertaken in Section V of this Article. 
43. Excluded from consideration here are trust fund cases like Hoopa Valley Tribe 
v. United States, 596 F.2d 435 (Ct. C1. 1979), where the claim is actually one to recover 
money improperly retained by the government. These, together with contract claims, were 
thought by the Testan Court not to require a separate statute or regulation mandating 
compensation for the damage sustained. See 424 U.S. a t  401-02. Trust claims of the Hoopa 
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Indians and the Quinalt Tribe, which were consolidated by the 
Court of Claims. Pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887, 
the tribe's reservation, which consisted mostly of forested areas, 
had been divided and allotted to individual I n d i a n ~ . ~ ~  The Act 
provided that lands so allotted be held by the United States "in 
trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such 
allotment shall have been made."4VI'he Interior Department 
managed the allotted tracts and the proceeds from timber sales." 
The Mitchell plaintiffs asserted that the United States had 
breached its trust relationship with the allottees by failing to 
obtain fair market value for the allottees' timber, failing to obtain 
adequate interest on monies held, and assessing excessive admin- 
istrative charges.4s The United States contended that the court 
lacked jurisdiction over breach of trust claims." 
The Court of Claims rejected the government's jurisdictional 
challenge. It noted that the General Allotment Act expressly de- 
clared the existence of a fiduciary relationship." Employing the 
key phrase from Testan, the court held that this explicit congres- 
sional declaration of trust status " '[could] fairly be interpreted 
as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the 
damage sustained' " as a result of a demonstrated breach of that 
trust.51 The court relied on its earlier decision in Eastport Steam- 
ship Corp. v .  United States,52 a case also relied upon by the 
Testan court, in support of its conclusion that it is not required 
that Congress state that a damage action for breach of trust will 
lie. It is enough that a statute, fairly interpreted, grants a right 
to a monetary recovery by impl ica t i~n .~~ 
The court thus concluded that the General Allotment Act 
should be interpreted as implying a right to monetary recovery 
for breach of a trust established pursuant to its terms. To hold 
Valley variety therefore do not raise the jurisdictional problems presented by actions 
seeking damages for the breach of other kinds of trust duties. 
44. 591 F.2d 1300 (Ct. Cl.), cert. .granted, 99 S. Ct. 2880 (1979). 
45. 591 F.2d a t  1300. 
46. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976). See also id. 8 462. 
47. 591 F.2d a t  1301. 
48. Id. a t  1301 n.4. 
49. Id. a t  1301. For six years the government was willing to defend on the merits. But 
in 1977, the year following the Supreme Court's decision in Testan, the government 
belatedly moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id. 
50. Id. a t  1302. 
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. a t  400). 
52. 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. C1. 1967). 
53. 591 F.2d a t  1302 & n.12. 
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otherwise would permit the government to waste allotted Indian 
land without providing the wronged party the right to recover in 
the Court of Claims.54 But for a Tucker Act remedy, the plaintiffs, 
though wronged, would be without a remedy altogether." 
The most persuasive reason for the court's holding was that 
"[tlhe trust language in the statute means that compensation 
can be recovered for a breach of trust . . . ."56 In a concurring 
opinion Judge Nichols saw this trust declaration as crucial and 
as the factor satisfying Testan: "If the United States declares 
itself by statute to be trustee of another's property, it assumes in 
my view an obligation to respond monetarily, in an action not 
sounding in tort, for maladministration of the property that de- 
prives the beneficiary of its value."57 Both the majority and con- 
curring opinions seem to have had in mind the well-established 
principal that a right of action against the trustee is an integral 
element of a trust re la t i~nship.~~ Their implicit rationale was that 
by the very act of declaring a trust status, Congress impliedly 
mandated compensation for breach of that trust. 
The Mitchell court, after making its basic jurisdictional con- 
clusion, went on to show that conclusion to be consistent with its 
prior cases and with the expectation of Congre~s .~~ Having found 
jurisdiction in the General Allotment Act, the court concluded 
that it was unnecessary to consider whether other statutes cited 
by plaintiffs were "independent" sources of jurisdicti~n.~~ It was 
also unnecessary to distinguish numerous cases relied on by the 
-- - 
54. Id. a t  1302-03. 
55. Id. This line of reasoning was one of Judge Nichols' points of departure from the 
majority. In his view, 
the doctrine of strict construction of the consent to  be sued is relaxed little if a t  
all by the fact, so far as it is the fact, that the claimant has no other remedy. 
No claimant can be said to be wholly without a remedy as long as Congress sits. 
Congress has always reserved, and still reserves, adjudication of many claims 
for itself, and historically, Indian claims have often been in that category. 
Id. at  1307-08 (Nichols, J ., concurring). 
The Supreme Court in Testan had itself considered the issue of alternative remedies. 
Like Judge Nichols, however, the Court specifically rejected a correlation between the lack 
of another remedy and the jurisdictional propriety of a Tucker Act claim. See 424 U.S. a t  
401-04. 
56. 591 F.2d a t  1303. 
57. Id. at  1306. 
58. See note 108 and accompanying text infra. The court in Whiskers v. United 
States, 600 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1979), articulated this principle, apparently considering 
it one for which citation to authority was not required. 600 F.2d a t  1335. See Section IV- 
D infra. 
59. 591 F.2d a t  1303-04. 
60. Id. a t  1304-05. 
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government as requiring the opposite result." The motion to dis- 
miss on jurisdictional grounds was therefore denied and the case 
was returned to the court's trial division for a disposition on the 
merits.'* The United States appealed. The Supreme Court 
granted the government's petition for certiorari? 
B. Cherry v. United States64 
One month after the decision in Mitchell was filed, the Court 
of Claims issued its opinion in Cherry, a case involving facts the 
court found particularly troubling. In October of 1965 Colonel 
Fred Cherry was shot down over North Vietnam and was cap- 
tured and imprisoned by the North Vietnamese. The government 
did not know with certainty what had become of him. During the 
more than seven years Cherry remained a prisoner of war, nearly 
$150,000 in pay and allowances to which he became entitled were 
paid into an account maintained for him by the Air Force? 
Pursuant to the Missing Persons Act, which authorizes the 
armed services to allot pay and allowances of missing personnel 
to their families when it is "in the interest of the member, his 
dependents, or the United  state^,"^^ the Air Force paid over to 
Cherry's wife nearly all of the funds credited to him. While being 
supported by her captured husband, Mrs. Cherry had a child by 
another man. Cherry claimed that his wife was extravagant with 
his funds and that the Air Force had failed to protect his interests 
by allowing her to dissipate his pay account "without let or hin- 
drance. "67 
The court agreed that the Air Force had neglected its statu- 
tory responsibility to consider Colonel Cherry's interest when it 
authorized depletion of his pay account for the benefit of his 
adulterous wife. The court concluded that "[tlhe Air Force as- 
61. Id. a t  1305-06. 
62. Id. a t  1306. One fairly plain departure from Testan was undertaken by the court 
in Mitchell. Although Justice Blackmun had been adamant that the Tucker Act itself was 
"merely jurisdictional" and that it did not itself "fundamentally" waive the government's 
immunity from suit on claims coming within its general terms, 424 US. a t  400, Judge 
Davis found that in the Tucker Act the United States implicitly consented to be sued. 
See 591 F.2d a t  1301, 1303, 1306. 
63. 99 S. Ct. 2880 (1979). 
64. 594 F.2d 795 (Ct. C1. 1979). 
65. Id. at 797. 
66. 37 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976). 
67. 594 F.2d a t  797. Cherry also claimed that the Missing Persons Act was unconstitu- 
tional because it authorized a confiscation of property without due process of law. The 
court rejected this argument. Id. a t  797-99. 
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sumed the role of trustee for Colonel Cherry's pay and allow- 
ances-the Missing Persons Act and the Air Force regulations 
envision such a relationship, although the word 'trustee' is not 
specifically used."6R The court cited several reasons in support of 
this conclusion. First, the court suggested that the statute would 
be unconstitutional unless it were interpreted as contemplating 
that the holding and disbursement of the fund would be consis- 
tent with trust standards? Second, the court concluded that in 
carrying out their statutory duties under the Missing Persons Act, 
including collecting pay and allowances, forwarding previously 
designated allowances to the family, and making a change in the 
allotment when changed circumstances warrant, "the armed 
services [had] accepted the role of trustee for their missing ser- 
vicemen, with its attendant duties, including the obligation to 
account for breach of fiduciary duties."70 Third, citing Mitchell, 
the court argued that the "[dlefendant [would] not, we think, 
allege that it owes servicemen missing in action a lower duty than 
i t  does an Indian, whose funds it manages in trust."71 The court 
therefore concluded that the Air Force had breached its trust 
duties, was liable to Cherry in some amount, and remanded for 
a determination of that amount, to be calculated as the total of 
sums paid by the United States to "Mrs. Cherry in violation of 
its duty to administer the account of Colonel Cherry in his inter- 
est, equally with the interest of his dependents and the United 
States. "72 
The majority opinion by Judge Nichols did not focus on the 
court's jurisdiction to pass on Colonel Cherry's claim, other than 
to note in a sentence that jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. 8 
1491.73 Testan was not cited, nor did the court analyze whether 
the Missing Persons Act could " 'fairly be interpreted as mandat- 
ing compensation by the Federal Government for the damages 
sustained.' "74 A forceful separate opinion by Judge Bennett, how- 
ever, questioned the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Judge 
Bennett argued that the congressionally created trust relation- 
ship in Mitchell impliedly authorized a monetary recovery for 
68. Id. a t  799. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 799-80. 
71. Id. at 799. 
72. Id. a t  801. 
73. Id. at 797. 
74. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. at 400 (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United 
States, 372 F.2d at 1009). 
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breach of trust. That approach was consistent with Testan. By 
contrast, the Cherry majority had manufactured a trust relation- 
ship, there being nothing in the Missing Persons Act to indicate 
Congress had ever contemplated one. The court's decision to 
award damages to Cherry was therefore based on " 'unanchored 
judge-created principles of fiduciary law' "75 instead of congres- 
sional authorization. Judge Bennett concluded that the wrong 
done Cherry was within the class of wrongs for which there is no 
judicial remedy. "Such wrongs,'' he wrote, "are ghosts in the law 
which the court now would slay with weapons not given to it but 
belonging to others vested with the exercise of political judg- 
ment~. ' ' '~  
C. Duncan v. United States77 
Mabel Duncan and other Pomo Indians of the Robinson 
Rancheria in California obtained a federal district court declara- 
tory judgment that termination of their rancheria status was un- 
lawful. They sought monetary recovery in the Court of Claims on 
the theory that the unlawful termination constituted a breach of 
trust. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . ' ~  
The Robinson Rancheria was established in 1909 as one of 
many small Indian reservations created in California in the early 
years of this century to ameliorate the landless condition of many 
California Indians. In 1958 Congress passed a law providing for 
the termination of certain California rancherias upon approval by 
the affected Indians of a plan for distribution of the rancheria 
lands. Termination of rancheria status had the significant impact 
of ending the affected Indians' rights to receive special federal 
75. 594 F.2d a t  803 (Bennett, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Mitchell v. 
United States, 591 F.2d at 1302). 
76. Id. Less convincingly, Judge Bennett argued that Cherry's claim was beyond the 
court's jurisdiction because the claim was really one based on negligence theory and was 
therefore a tort claim beyond the scope of the Tucker Act. Id. at 802. 
The majority opinion in Cherry has raised more eyebrows than Judge Bennett's. The 
Tenth Circuit opinion in Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1979)' quoted 
from the Cherry dissent and characterized the majority's inattention to Testan as curious. 
Id. a t  1338 n.13. See Section IV-D infia. Indeed, Judge Nichols, the author of the C h e w  
majority opinion, subsequently acknowledged that the opinion's jurisdictional analysis 
was problematic. See Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 823 (Ct. Cl.l979)(Nichols, 
J., concurring). 
77. 597 F.2d 1337 (Ct. C1.1979)' petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3132 (U.S. Aug. 
28, 1979) (NO. 79-36). 
78. Id. at 1339. 
* 
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services and of exposing the distributed lands to state and local 
regulation and tax liability. Prior to distribution of the rancheria 
lands, however, the Secretary of the Interior was to effect certain 
improvements on the lands, including the installation or rehabili- 
tation of irrigation or domestic water systems that the Secretary 
and the Indians had agreed upon.'@ 
The Porno Indians of the Robinson Rancheria approved the 
proposed distribution plan in 1960, and the distributionqwas com- 
pleted in 1963. Following a delay due to continued negotiation 
over the provision of sewer services, the rancheria was formally 
terminated in 1965. Prior to termination, however, the inade- 
quate water supply and the poor sanitation system had not been 
i m p r o ~ e d . ~  Duncan and the other claimants sought damages for 
breach of the trust relationship they contended had existed be- 
tween themselves and the United States. They specifically sought 
damages for failure to provide adequate water and sanitation 
systems, failure to reserve a right-of-way in distributed lands to 
the community wood lot, exposure to state property taxes, loss of 
federal services provided to reservation Indians, destruction of 
their native culture, emotional distress, and bodily inj~ries.~'  
Relying on Mitchell, the Duncan court summarily rejected 
the government's jurisdictional argument that "even if a statute 
establishes a trust relationship, that law does not 'fairly mandate 
compensation' " under the Testan principle.82 The court then pro- 
ceeded to analyze whether such a trust relationship existed in 
favor of the Duncan  claimant^.^^ The court's approach was more 
involved than it had been in Mitchell, where the court had rea- 
soned that the word "trust" in the relevant statute mandated 
compensation by the federal government for the damage sus- 
tained." Citing Cherry, the Duncan court found that the lack of 
79. Id. at 1340. 
80. Id. a t  1340-41. 
81. Id. a t  1344 & n.lO. 
82. Id. a t  1341. 
83. It is not clear whether the court considered the actual existence of a trust relation- 
ship to go to the court's subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims, or whether it  
considered the jurisdictional requirement satisfied by the allegation that such a trust 
relationship existed, the final determination of that issue being a necessary element of the 
court's consideration, on the merits, of the entitlement of the claimants to a monetary 
recovery. 
84. 591 F.2d at 1302. The Duncan court took substantial comfort from the indication 
in the district court's declaratory judgment that the Robinson Rancheria lands had been 
held in trust, and went so far as to state that it was "bound by that ruling under the 
doctrine of issue preclusion." 597 F.2d at 1341-42. It would certainly seem that a determi- 
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trust terminology in the legislation authorizing the establishment 
of the California rancherias and legislation appropriating funds 
to purchase the land of which they would be comprised was not 
crucial given the congressional expectation that the lands be held 
in trust: "Congress need not expressly use a talismanic phrase 
such as 'trust relationship' or 'hold in trust' in order to establish 
a trust relati~nship."~ The Interior Department's continued un- 
derstanding that the rancheria was held by the united States in 
trust for the Pomos bolstered the conclusion that the intent of 
Congress had been to establish a bona fide trust relationship? 
The rancheria termination legislation, which employed the 
phrase "federal trust relationship," was also entitled to "great 
weight" in construing the original legislation, and confirmed the 
conclusion that a trust relationship had existed between the 
Pomos and the United States with regard to the Robinson Ranch- 
e~-ia.~' 
The Court of Claims thus concluded that the government's 
failure to provide adequate water and sanitation systems consti- 
tuted a "serious breach of trust."88 The court rejected any recov- 
ery based on injury to Pomo culture or on emotional or psycholog- 
ical injuries. It concluded that, notwithstanding congressional 
creation of a trust status mandating compensation for certain 
kinds of damages, it did not authorize a recovery for such 
nation for purposes of declaratory and inhnctive relief that a trust relationship existed 
in favor of a group of Indians might not of itself satisfy the Mitchell-Testan requirement 
of congressional declaration of a trust, from which is implied a right to a monetary recov- 
ery under the Tucker Act for its breach. The Tenth Circuit, for example, perceived that a 
relationship could be defined as a "trust" for some purposes, but not for purposes of the 
jurisdictional inquiry under the Mitchell-Testan framework. See text accompanying 
note 102 infra. It was perhaps in tacit acknowledgement of this fact that Judge Davis in 
Duncan undertook plenary consideration of the existence of a trust relationship between 
the Pomo claimants and the United States. 
85. 597 F.2d at 1342. 
86. Id. at 1342 & n.6. 
87. Id. at 1343. The Tenth Circuit, in analyzing Duncan, took the position that this 
congressional use of trust terminology, although remote in time from the legislation that 
gave rise to the creation of California rancherias, was enough to supply the jurisdictional 
link of congressional authorization of a damages action based on breach of that trust. See 
Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332,1338 (10th Cir. 1979). This view appears correct. 
There is no suggestion in Testan that congressional authorization of a monetary recovery 
for breach of some substantive right must have been given contemporaneously with the 
creation of the right itself. 
88. 597 F.2d at 1343-44. The loss of land through state tax sales was also considered 
a compensable breach of trust. Id. at 1347 n.14. Claims for damages based on the post- 
termination sale of rancheria lands to non-Indians and exposure to state regulation of 
activities on distributed lands were left for further factual development. Id. at 1347. 
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"nebulous and remote" consequential damages.89 Remand to the 
court's trial division was ordered for a determination of the extent 
of the government's liability.@O 
D. Whiskers v. United Statesg1 
Chloe Whiskers and six other named plaintiffs sought recov- 
ery under the Tucker Act, for themselves and the class of South- 
ern Paiute Indians they claimed to represent, for the alleged fail- 
ure of the Secretary of the Interior to include them in the distribu- 
tion of an Indian Claims Commission award in which they alleg- 
edly were entitled to share.92 The claimants relied in large part 
on breach of trust theories.93 The district court dismissed for lack 
of juri~diction?~ Plaintiffs appealed. 
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge McKay, 
briefly reviewed Testan and stated that "the controlling question 
is whether federal law mandates compensation for damages 
plaintiffs may have sustained because of the Secretary's actions 
in derogation of their rights."g5 The court agreed that congres- 
sional declaration of trust status for a particular fund "itself man- 
dates compensation for damages sustained from breach of that 
trust," and thus satisfies the requirements of Testan. @ T h e  court 
succinctly stated the rationale for this conclusion: 
Liability on the part of a trustee for breach of his fiduciary 
duties is inherent in a trust relationship. Unless it appeared 
affirmatively that Congress meant to create something less than 
a trust relationship when it used the term "trust" in referring 
89. Id. at 1345-46. 
90. Id. at 1347. 
91. 600 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1979). Whiskers is the only one of the four breach of trust 
cases principally treated in this Article to have been brought in federal district court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(a)(2) rather than in the Court of Claims pursuant to 8 1491. 
See note 22 and accompanying text supra. In considering the case on appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit had the benefit of the Court of Claims opinions in the three previously, discussed 
cases and it considered each in reaching its decision. See 600 F.2d at 1335 & n.5, 1338 & 
n.12. 
92. 600 F.2d at 1333-34. 
93. Id. at 1334. The plaintiffs also sought recovery based on an alleged breach of 
statutory duties regardless of the existence of a trust, and on fdth amendment theories 
that the government's failure to award them any portion of the judgment amounted to a 
deprivation of property without due process and an uncompensated taking. Id. These 
claims were dismissed, although it is not clear whether dismissal of the constitutional 
claims was for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. Id. at 1338-39. 
94. Id. at 1334. 
95. Id. at 1335. 
96. Id. 
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to a particular fund, we would necessarily assume that Congress 
intended to establish nothing less than a valid trust-complete 
with fiduciary duties and concomitant financial liability for 
their breach.87 
The court then considered whether Congress had expressed the 
intent that the judgment award in question be held in trust pend- 
ing distribution? 
Neither the act that appropriated money to pay the Indian 
Claims Commission award in favor of the Southern Paiutes nor 
the act that provided for distribution of the award indicated to 
the court's satisfaction that the fund was held in trust prior to its 
d i s t r ib~t ion .~~  In reaching this conclusion, the court did not sim- 
ply ascertain that trust terminology was not employed; i t  also 
considered whether the duties statutorily imposed upon the Sec- 
retary of the Interior amounted to congressional creation of a 
trust relationship.loO Several other statutes utilizing trust termi- 
nology were held inapplicable to the judgment fund in question.lol 
The court also reasoned that the assertion that the "relationship 
of the United States to its Indian citizens is in the nature of a 
trust" did not satisfy the Testan requirement of "a specific con- 
gressional mandate" to compensate monetarily for the damages 
allegedly sustained.lo2 Neither was the court persuaded by lan- 
guage in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, lo3 a pre- 
Testan case, " 'that funds appropriated to Indians to satisfy judg- 
ments of the Indian Claims Commission or of [the Court of 
97. Id. Just as usage of trust terminology would not necessarily preclude, in the Tenth 
Circuit's view, a finding that Congress had not intended to create an actual trust relation- 
ship in contemplation of law, the absence of such terms would not foreclose the conclusion 
that Congress had intended to create a trust relationship. See id. at 1338. The key in each 
case, according to the Tenth Circuit, is the intention of Congress. 
98. The Tenth Circuit, like the Court of Claims in Mitchell, made it cliar that a 
congressional declaration of trust status, from which a right to recover monetarily for its 
breach could be implied, was a necessary element of its jurisdictional inquiry under 
Testan rather than a question for resolution on the merits. See id. at 1335, 1338; note 83 
and accompanying text supra. 
99. 600 F.2d at 1335-56. 
100. Id. at 1338. On this point it is likely that the Cherry court would have gone the 
other way. Application of that court's freewheeling approach would readily result in the 
conclusion that in carrying out its statutory duties under Indian Claims Commission 
award distribution statutes, including enrolling eligible Indians, determining eligibility, 
and distributing the award, the Interior Department had "accepted the role of trustee" 
for its Indian distributees. See text accompanying note 70 supra. 
101. 600 F.2d at 1336-37. 
102. Id. at 1337. 
103. 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. C1. 1975). 
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Claims], as well as funds produced by tribal activities, are, when 
kept in the Treasury, held in trust for the Indians.' "lo4 The court 
sought-somewhat laboriously-to distinguish the case,lo5 but 
took principal solace from the pre-Testan status of that opinion.lo6 
Finding no congressional trust declaration, the court concluded 
there was no statute mandating federal compensation to the 
plaintiffs for the government's alleged breach of trust. Dismissal 
of their action for lack of jurisdiction was thus affirmed.lo7 
E. Summary 
The basic conclusion of the Court of Claims in Mitchell that 
a congressional declaration of the existence of a trust relationship 
satisfies the jurisdictional strictures of Testan for breach of trust 
claims against the federal government is not startling. Trust sta- 
tus inherently entails a right of recovery against the trustee by the 
trust beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty.los Short of the 
unlikely appearance in some statute of a phrase such as 
"violation of this act shall render the United States liable for the 
damages proximately caused thereby," it is difficult to suggest 
what type of statutory scheme could more readily be "interpreted 
as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the 
damage sustained" than one that expressly declares the United 
States to be a trustee with regard to a particular fund or to partic- 
104. Id. at 1392. 
105. Id. a t  1337 & n.lO. 
106. Id. at 1337-38. In doing so, the court seems justified. Arising as the case did in 
the pre-Testan era, the Court of Claims' subject matter jurisdiction was neither chal- 
lenged in Cheyenne-Arapaho nor treated by the court. In remarking that "funds appropri- 
ated to Indians to satisfy judgments of the Indian Claims Commission . . . are, when kept 
in the Treasury, held in trust for the Indians," the court was not engaged in a Mitchell- 
like quest for the requisite congressional mandate for monetary compensation for damages 
incurred that is necessary under Testan to establish Tucker Act jurisdiction. Indeed, two 
of the cases cited by the Cheyenne-Arapaho court in support of its conclusion, Seminole 
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942), and Menominee Tribe v. United States, 59 
F. Supp. 137 (Ct. C1. 1945), were brought under expansive special jurisdiction statutes, 
not the Tucker Act. See note 23 supra. Neither Seminole Nation, Menominee Tribe, nor 
the third case cited by the court, United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973), involved 
judgment funds held in the Treasury. Rather, these cases involved, respectively, a trust 
fund established pursuant to a treaty, a log fund created by statute, and property held in 
trust pursuant to an Indian allotment act. It is IittIe wonder the Tenth Circuit declined 
to read much into the Cheyenne-Arapaho characterization. 
107. 600 F.2d at 1337. 
108. See, e.g., Standard Mach. Co. v. Duncan Shaw Corp., 208 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 
1953); Luttrell v. Turner, 307 Ky. 197, 209 S.W.2d 856 (1948); G. BOCERT, HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF TRUSTS 4 157 (5th ed. 1973); 3 A. S c m ,  THE LAW OF TRUSTS 4 205 (3d ed. 
1967). 
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ular property. 
The Tenth Circuit's assessment that Duncan is indistin- 
guishable from Mitchell, given the Congressional declaration in 
both cases of a trust relationship, seems entirely valid. Cherry 
and Whiskers are more troublesome. Given Testan and the 
breach of trust claim refinement offered by Mitchell, Cherry ap- 
pears to be wrongly decided. Judge Nichols' opinion in Cherry 
ignores the jurisdictional strictures imposed by Testan, in con- 
trast to his concurring opinion in Mitchell, which explained more 
clearly than did the majority opinion how the result reached in 
Mitchell was consistent with Testan. The Cherry majority failed 
to treat Testan; although the court's rhetorical statement that 
the United States should not purport to owe a lesser duty to a 
missing serviceman than it does an Indian trust beneficiary has 
emotional appeal, it does not satisfy the rigid jurisdictional in- 
quiry required by Testan. 
In light of Testan, Cherry should have been decided the same 
way as Whiskers. Notwithstanding the possibility that the 
Whiskers claimants had experienced a true monetary loss a t  the 
hands of the government, the court in that case refrained from 
Cherry-style bootstrapping and subjected the statutes in question 
to the demands of Testan. In Whiskers the Tenth Circuit has 
properly at least drawn a line between breach of trust claims 
that-according to Testan requirements-fall within Tucker Act 
jurisdiction, and those that do not. The Cherry court overstepped 
that line. 
V .  Testan REVISITED 
To conclude that on the basis of Testan there was no Tucker 
Act jurisdiction over Colonel Cherry's claim and the claims of the 
Whiskers claimants is not necessarily to conclude that there was 
no proper Tucker Act jurisdiction over those breach of trust 
claims. The Testan opinion is so fraught with difficulties that the 
jurisdictional standards it announced must be seriously ques- 
tioned. Although Cherry is contrary to Testan, Testan is contrary 
to doctrines of federal jurisdiction in general, and the Tucker Act 
in particular. 
In reaching its decision that there was no Tucker Act juris- 
diction over plaintiffs' claims in Testan, the Supreme Court re- 
lied on the Court of Claims' decisions in Eastport Steamship v. 
United States'09 and Mosca v. United States.'1° These two cases 
109. 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
110. 417 F.2d 1382 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). 
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teach that a claim not based upon a contract or for the return of 
money paid to the government must be based upon a federal 
statute that requires compensation by the government for dam- 
ages.lll However, the Court's characterization of this proposition 
as an "established principle"l12 is unwarranted. 
The plaintiffs in Eastport Steamship alleged that the Mari- 
time Commission wrongfully withheld consent to a ship sale re- 
sulting in the loss of a contract more favorable than the one by 
which the ship was eventually ~ 0 l d . l ~ ~  Damages were claimed in 
the amount of the price differential between the two contracts. 
Judge Davis stated that the noncontractual claims that come 
before the Court of Claims are of "two somewhat overlapping" 
types: 
[Tlhose in which the plaintiff has paid money over to the Gov- 
ernment, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of 
that sum; and those demands in which money has not been paid 
but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless entitled to pay- 
ment from the treasury.lt4 
In cases falling within the latter category, "the allegation must 
be that the particular provision of law relied upon grants the 
claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to be paid a certain 
sum."l15 For this proposition, Judge Davis cited a single case, 
South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States. 116 
This case, however, did not fall within the latter category; it 
involved a suit to recover an import fee paid the government that 
was claimed to have been illegally exacted.l17 It also failed to 
employ analysis that segregated Tucker Act claims by category. 
Judge Davis reiterated in Eastport Steamship that, in the 
second category of cases, " 'a claimant who says that he is enti- 
tled to money from the United States because a statute or a 
regulation [or the Constitution] grants him that right, in terms 
or by implication, can properly come to the Court of Claims, a t  
least if his claim is not frivoulous but arguable.' "m However, the 
111. United States v. Testan, 424 U S .  at 400. 
112. Id. 
113. 372 F.2d at 1006-07. 
114. Id. at 1007. 
115. Id. 
116. 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. C1. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965). 
117. Id. at 623-26. 
118. 372 F.2d at 1008 (brackets in original) (quoting Ralston Steel Corp. v. United 
States, 340 F.2d 663, 667 (Ct. C1. 1965)). 
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quoted opinion, Ralston Steel Corp. v .  United States, made the 
quoted statement in the context of a first category, or "money 
rethined," case.120 The statement apparently referred to all types 
of claims brought pursuant to the Tucker Act. In addition, the 
Ralston Steel court specifically stated that "Wlhere an action 
rests upon a statute or regulation, that particular enactment need 
not contain a specific provision permitting a suit for money; our 
general jurisdictional-statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, serves the pur- 
pose."121 
The Court of Claims in Eastport Steamship held that a par- 
ticular provision of the Shipping Act did not, expressly or by 
implication, confer a right to recover monetarily against the 
United States.122 But the court did not find that this fact deprived 
it of jurisdiction, or that it meant that sovereign immunity had 
not been waived. On the contrary, the court specifically stated 
that it had jurisdiction over the claim; the plaintiff simply lost 
on the merits since he failed to demonstrate his entitlement to a 
monetary re~0very.l~~ 
Two points emerge from this analysis. First, the Eastport 
Steamship opinion's disparate treatment of contract and "money 
119. 340 F.2d 663 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965). 
120. Id. at  668. 
121. Id. at  668 n.5. 
122. 372 F.2d at 1009. 
123. Id. at  1011 n.14. For the Eastport Steamship court, the allegation that a statute 
expressly or implicitly grants a right to money damages was enough to establish the court's 
jurisdiction; the determination of whether the statute in fact does so was not thought a 
part of the court's jurisdictional inquiry. Only if the allegations were frivolous would 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction be proper. The court did not spell out what would consti- 
tute frivolousness in this context, but it is clear the requirement is not a difficult one to 
satisfy. The court held that plaintiffs' allegation that the Shipping Act granted it the right 
to compensation was not frivolous, although the court had said this of the allegation: 
There is not a word in the text [of the act] suggesting that the United States 
will compensate an applicant who suffers a business loss because of the Commis- 
sion's improper failure to grant the request. Nor are we pointed to anything in 
the Act's legislative history hinting a t  that result. There is no decision of this 
or any other federal court holding or intimating that the United States will be 
liable under the Tucker Act for such a commercial injury resulting from a failure 
or wrong done in the course of the regulatory process. We would have to break 
entirely new and treacherous ground to find in [the act] an implied directive 
to allow such compensation. 
Id. at  1009 (emphasis added). The allegations of a statutory right of recovery in Whiskers 
and Cherry would not have been considered frivolous by the Eastport Steamship court if 
it was able to so evaluate the allegation made there and still deem it not frivolous. 
The nonfrivolity threshold was treated a t  greater length in Ralston Steel, see 340 F.2d 
at  666-68 & n.4.' which the Eastport Steamship court cited in reaching its conclusion. See 
372 F.2d at  1011 n.14. 
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retained" claims on the one hand, and other noncontract claims 
on the other, was not shown in Eastport Steamship to be based 
upon recognized distinctions; the authorities relied on in making 
the distinctions did not support them. Second, and more signifi- 
cantly, the Eastport Steamship opinion did not ultimately pur- 
port to establish criteria for determination of jurisdiction or 
waiver of sovereign immunity in the manner for which it was cited 
in Testan; the Eastport Steamship court deemed jurisdiction sat- 
isfied by allegation of statutory right. Its consideration of the 
actual existence of a statutory right to recover monetarily was 
considered to be related only to the merits of the claim. 
Mosca is technically in a similar posture, since the Court of 
Claims dismissed Mosca's petition for failure to state a 
~ l a im '~~-a  dismissal on the merits. However, the Mosca court 
also misperceived Eastport Steamship as having held that 
jurisdiction over claims other than those seeking a return of 
money would be had only where a particular provision of law 
granted the right to a monetary re~0very.l~~ 
To be sure, by the time Testan was decided, the Eastport 
Steamship standards had been openly employed in analyzing ju- 
risdiction; but it is hardly accurate to enshrine them as "settled 
principles." For example, in his dissent in Chambers u. United 
States, 12' Judge Skelton utilized the Eastport Steamship ap- 
proach, concluding that Tucker Act jurisdiction was lacking.ln 
The majority, however, including the author of the decision in 
Eastport Steamship, was not concerned about the court's juris- 
diction. Judge Skelton also relied on an Eastport Steamship juris- 
dictional test in his dissent in Allison u. United States. '28 Again, 
the majority did not deem Eastport Steamship relevant to juris- 
diction. In fact, there is no pre-Testan case in which a Court of 
Claims majority employed the Eastport Steamship doctrine, in 
the manner the Testan Court employed it, in determining the 
existence of subject matter jurisdiction. 
It is surprising that Justice Blackmun found any basis for his 
"settled principles" reference. As a federal circuit judge, he had 
applied Eastport Steamship to jurisdiction-just as he did in 
Testan-but was criticized for this position by the Court of 
Claims in Chambers: 
124. 417 F.2d at 1383. 
125. Id. at 1386. 
126. 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
127. Id. at 1083 (Skelton, J., dissenting). 
128. 451 F.2d 1035, 1043 (Ct. C1. 1971) (Skelton, J., dissenting). 
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[The United States'] primary reliance [for its view that a 
backpay remedy of the sort a t  issue in Testan was improper], 
however, seems to be on Gnotta u. United States. . . . Judge 
(now Justice) Blackmun wrote the opinion sustaining dismissal 
of plaintiff's action by the District Court. He adopted that part 
of the District Court's opinion which held . . . : 
None of the executive orders or regulations which the 
complaint cites purports to confer any right on any em- 
ployee of the United States to institute a civil action for 
damages against the United States, in the event of their 
violation, even if it should be established that plaintiff's 
failure to have been promoted . . . was in fact due to 
discrimination in violation of the Executive Orders 
pleaded. 
The court was of the opinion that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 5 
l346(a) (2) ; (conferring on the District Courts concurrent juris- 
diction with the Court of Claims) was not broad enough to con- 
fer jurisdiction in such a case. Our line of cases, expressing a 
different view, apparently was not cited or ~0nsidered.l~~ 
It was, therefore, by no means "settled" that in claims other 
than those founded upon contract or money improperly retained, 
a statute need fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation 
for particular damages before Tucker Act jurisdiction could be 
found. Indeed, the weight of authority was to the contrary. Refer- 
ence has been made to several Court of Claims cases that em- 
ployed jurisdictional analysis at odds with the Testan approachlsO 
or that proceeded to the merits over a dissenting objection to 
jurisdiction along the lines of Testan. lJ1 Other pre-Testan Court 
of Claims opinions employed a much less rigid jurisdictional 
analysis than that which was applied in Te~tar2.l~~ In 1974 the 
Third Circuit rejected the 
reasoning, advanced by the United States on Appeal, . . . that 
the Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to award damages to persons 
who have a statutory right to receive a sum of money; and, since 
129. 451 F.2d at 1052 (citations omitted) (emphasis added)'(quoting Gnotta v. United 
States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1969)). Justice Blackmun at least had "constructive 
notice" of the quoted passage, having cited Chambers in his opinion in Testan. 424 U.S. 
at 396 n.3, 404, 405. 
130. See Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045,1052 (Ct. C1.1971); Eastport S.S. 
Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1008, 1011 n.14 (Ct. C1.1967); Ralston Steel Corp. 
v. United States, 340 F.2d 663, 666-68 & n.5 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965). 
131. Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. C1. 1971); Allison v. United 
States, 451 F.2d 1035 (Ct. C1. 1971). 
132. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 428 F.2d 844, 846 (Ct. C1. 1970). 
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the District Court found that the National Housing Act confers 
no such right on plaintiffs, the court decided that it had no 
Tucker Act jurisdiction. . . . 
. . . Plaintiffs allege that the National Housing Act implic- 
itly grants them the right to receive damages from the United 
States for violation of specific provisions. They have asserted a 
claim "founded upon" an Act of Congress, and their allegation 
supports the district court's jurisdiction to decide the merits of 
their claim 
No less a luminary than Justice Holmes saw no distinction, 
for jurisdictional purposes, between general federal question 
claims "arising under" and Tucker Act claims "founded upon" a 
law of the United States.134 In his view, the former required of 
plaintiffs nothing more than a claim, made in good faith and not 
frivolous, that federal law was the basis of the rights alleged in 
the complaint.Iu When such a claim is made, "there is jurisdic- 
tion whether the claim ultimately be held good or bad."lJ6 
The closely intertwined issue of waiver of sovereign immun- 
ity in Testan is also problematic.ls7 It will be recalled that Justice 
Blackmun in Testan rejected the view that the Tucker Act itself 
"fundamentally waives sovereign immunity with respect to any 
claim invoking a constitutional provision or a federal statute or 
regulation."lJ8 Citing and partially quoting United States u. 
Sherwood, 13' the Court stated that "except as Congress has con- 
133. Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1371 (3d Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). The 
court added: "We reject any statement to the contrary contained in Eastport Steamship 
Corp. v. United States . . . ." Id. 
134. United States v. Emery, 237 U.S. 28, 32 (1915). 
135. See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25-26 (1913) (opinion 
by Justice Holmes). 
136. Id. a t  25. In 1927 Judge Augustus N. Hand stated: 
To limit the recovery in cases "founded" upon a law of Congress to cases where 
the law provides in terms for a recovery would make that provision of the Tucker 
Act almost entirely unavailable, because it would allow recovery only in cases 
where laws other than the Tucker Act already created a right of recovery. 
"Founded" must therefore mean reasonably involving the application of a law 
of Congress. 
Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique v. United States, 21 F.2d 465, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1927), 
aff'd, 26 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1928). 
137. Although the questions of Tucker Act jurisdiction and sovereign immunity have 
sometimes been thought potentially distinct inquiries, see, e.g., Davis v. Romney, 490 
F.2d 1360, 1371 & n.6, 1372 (3d Cir. 1974), in Testan Justice Blackmun equated the two: 
" '[Tlhe terms of [the United States'] consent to be sued in any court define that court's 
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.' " 424 U.S. at 399 (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). 
138. 424 U.S. at 400. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra. 
139. 312 U.S. 584 (1941). 
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sented to a cause of action against the United States, 'there is no 
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims . . . to entertain suits against 
the United States.'"140 The Court also reasoned that where a 
claim is not based on contract or for the return of money paid to 
the government, the sovereign immunity of the United States is 
not waived unless the substantive statute or regulation relied on 
itself authorizes compensation by the United States.141 The accu- 
racy of these views will now be examined. 
Eastport Steamship was cited in support of the last- 
mentioned proposition. The lack of convincing demonstration in 
that opinion that some Tucker Act claims were to be treated 
differently than others has been noted,14* as has the fact that the 
Eastport Steamship test relied on in Testan was employed by the 
Court of Claims to evaluate a claim on the merits, not to deter- 
mine whether the sovereign immunity of the United States had 
been waived. 
In Sherwood the Court did not, contrary to Justice Black- 
muds reliance on the opinion, speak of the need for a waiver of 
sovereign immunity as to a discrete cause of action; rather, the 
Court spoke of the "classes of claims" as to which the sovereign 
immunity of the United States had been waived.14' Most signifi- 
cantly, the Sherwood Court's entire discussion of the waiver of 
sovereign immunity related to the Tucker Act.la5 The Court 
stated that the Tucker Act "must be interpreted in the light of 
its function in giving consent of the Government to be sued";lu 
the Court also spoke of the Act as "authorizing suits against the 
G~vernment . "~~~ It referred to the Act as defining "the classes of 
claims against the United States which could be litigated in the 
Court of Claims."148 The Sherwood Court did not perceive any 
difference between types of Tucker Act claims, treating "suits 
against the United States to recover damages for breach of con- 
tract" and those for "other specified classes of claims" a1ike.l" 
Finally, the Testan Court's unsubstantiated view that the 
424 U.S. at 399 (quoting 312 U.S. at 587-88). 
Id. at 400-01. 
See notes 114-20 and accompanying text supra. 
See notes 122-24 and accompanying text supra. 
312 U.S. at 590. 
Id. at 586-87, 589-91. 
Id. at 590. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 587. 
880 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
Tucker Act is not itself a fully adequate waiver of sovereign im- 
munity as to actions on any claim coming within its terms is 
simply contrary to the legislative history of the Act and the great 
weight of pre-Testan judicial authority on the point. The bill that 
became the Tucker Act was entitled a bill "to provide for bringing 
suits against the Government of the United States."Iw Propo- 
nents of the bill spoke of it as granting "the right to sue the 
United States."I5l It was stated that "the effect of the bill is that 
the United States can be made a party defendant in any suit 
where an individual could be made a party defendant."ls2 By the 
same token, opposition to the bill resulted partly from the con- 
cern that, through the enactment of such legislation, the United 
States would be permitting itself to be sued.lJ3 
It has been noted that Sherwood recognized that the Tucker 
Act waives sovereign immunity as to claims within the categories 
contained in the Act. Other Supreme Court opinions construing 
the Tucker Act or its predecessor are to the same effect.154 In 
Ralston Steel, cited in Eastport Steamship, the Court of Claims 
specifically stated that other statutes need not be looked to for 
authorization of a suit against the United States for money dam- 
ages where the action is based on a statute or regulation; the 
Tucker Act was itself deemed sufficient authorization for such 
actions.lJ5 Although there was not a total lack of authority for the 
view taken in Testan, lS6 that opinion's conclusion that the Tucker 
Act does not itself constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity as 
to claims coming within its terms, which are neither based on 
contract nor improperly retained money, appears incorrect when 
viewed against the historical background. 
150. 18 CONG. REC. 622 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Tucker). See also H.R. REP. NO. 1077, 
49th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1886). 
151. 18 CONG. REC. 622 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Reed). 
152. Id. That certain classes of claims were removed from the bill prior to enactment, 
see notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra, does not weaken the force of the statement 
in regard to those classes of claims that remained in the legislation as enacted. 
153. 18 CONG. REC. 2679 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Townshend). In the debate of a 
similar bill in 1862, Representative Diven complained that "[tlhe bill proposes to allow 
this nation to be sued and brought into court like a corporation or an individual." CONG. 
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1671 (1862). 
154. See, e.g, Soriano v. United States, 352 U S .  270, 273 (1957); Kendall v. United 
States, 107 U.S. 123, 125 (1882). 
155. 340 F.2d at  668 n.5. See also text accompanying note 121 supra. 
156. See, e.g., Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1371-72 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1974). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Even given the constraints of Testan, the Court of Claims 
was on firm ground in finding that it  had jurisdiction over the 
breach of trust claims raised in Mitchell and Duncan. Deference 
to Testan precluded the Tenth Circuit from remanding for con- 
sideration on the merits in Whiskers, and should have prevented 
consideration on the merits in Cherry. But the jurisdictional ap- 
proach of Testan was misguided. 
Viewed against the judicial and legislative background ex- 
amined in this Article, and assuming that the claims raised were 
not frivolous, the Court of Claims had jurisdiction to consider 
Colonel Cherry's claim. The district court had similar jurisdiction 
to review the claims raised in Whiskers, since the claims were 
"founded upon" acts of Congress. By the Tucker Act the United 
States has consented to suits for money damages founded upon 
federal statutes and regulations. Sovereign immunity was there- 
fore not a barrier to judicial consideration on the merits of these 
breach of trust claims. 
Once a court has proceeded to consider the merits of a 
Tucker Act claim, the Eastport Steamship doctrine, which was 
intended to be used in evaluating a claim on the merits rather 
than as a jurisdictional test, provides a practical means for deter- 
mining whether a claimant should prevail. Every governmental 
deviation from a statute or regulation should not result in an 
award of money to injured persons. Consideration of whether 
Congress intended by enacting a statute or regulatory scheme to 
compensate persons deprived of some right thereunder would be 
helpful in evaluating the propriety of awarding damages to claim- 
ants. This consideration, since it is not jurisdictional, should be 
supplemented appropriately; a court should also consider the 
decisional law on the compensability of claims of the same gen- 
eral typels7 and recognize that the clear objective of Congress in 
enacting the Tucker Act was to transfer to a judicial forum vir- 
157. The decision in Eastport Steamship suggested that judicial precedents might 
have a role to play in evaluating claims. After concluding that the act there in issue did 
not mandate compensation for the loss incurred, and that the legislative history was not 
to the contrary, the Court of Claims also indicated that "[tlhere is no decision of this or 
any other federal court holding or intimating that the United States will be liable under 
the Tucker Act for such a[n] . . . injury." 372 F.2d at 1009. 
During the debate that preceded adoption of the original Court of Claims act, Senator 
Clayton stated that the court would "decide [cases] according to established rules of 
justice, and . . . follow those rules as precedents." CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 111 
(1854). 
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tually all nontort 
United States.15u 
be appropriate to 
claims for monetary compensation against the 
For example, in a case like Whiskers, it would 
consider the comparatively liberal judicial doc- 
trines favoring Indians.I5!' 
To be sure, the end result might often be the same as it would 
be under Testan. Dismissal, however, would be on the merits for 
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, rather than 
for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has consistently, and 
in a variety of contexts, recognized the importance of this distinc- 
tion by making it,lB0 as did other courts in the pre-Testan era.161 
The Supreme Court will review Mitchell in the near future. 
The Court will be able to consider the case even against the 
strictures of Testan and reach the correct jurisdictional result. 
But given the difficulties that attend the opinion in Testan, and 
unfortunate decisions like Whiskers, hopefully the Court will take 
the opportunity to rethink Testan and reformulate the jurisdic- 
tional standards contained in that opinion. In reviewing Mitchell, 
the Court would do well to remember the admonition of Justice 
Holmes that it is "inadmissible" to consider "that the great act 
of justice embodied in the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is 
to be construed strictly and read with an adverse eye."162 
158. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra. 
159. See, e.g, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); United States v. 
Oneida Nation, 576 F.2d 870, 877 (Ct. C1. 1978). 
160. See, e.g, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542-43 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 
678, 682-83 (1946); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). 
161. See Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360,1371 (3d Cir. 1974); Ralston Steel Corp. v. 
United States, 340 F.2d 663, 667-68 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965). 
162. United States v. Emery, 237 U.S. 28, 32 (1915). 
